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GLOSSARY

Botnet – A botnet is a network of compromised devices used by a botnet owner to perform
various malicious tasks. The devices – often personal computers – called “Bots”
are under the control of a human “Botmaster.”
Ensemble method - An ensemble method is an approach that makes a set of classifers into
an ensemble by combining the prediction from each classifer possibly with
weights. It is regarded as one of the methods for improving the accuracy.
Machine learning algorithm - A machine learning algorithm refers to an algorithm that is
used to generate a statistical model from input data for various purposes from new
incoming data. In practice, the former phase is called training, and the latter is
called testing.

x

ABSTRACT

Author: Ryu, Songhui. M.S.
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: May 2018
Title: Comparison of Machine Learning Algorithms and Their Ensembles for Botnet
Detection
Major Professor: John Springer
A Botnet is a network of compromised devices controlled by a botmaster often for
nefarious purposes. Analyzing network traffc to detect Botnet traffc has historically been
an effective approach for systems monitoring for network intrusion. Although such
system have been applying various machine learning techniques, little investigation into a
comparison of machine algorithms and their ensembles has been undertaken. In this study,
three popular classifcation machine learning algorithms – Naive Bayes, Decision tree,
and Neural network – as well as the ensemble methods known to strengthen said
classifers are evaluated for enhanced results related to Botnet detection. This evaluation is
conducted with the CTU-13 public dataset, measuring the training time and accuracy
scores of each classifer.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview of the research study. It introduces the research
questions and covers the research signifcance, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations
which defne the extent of the study.

1.1 Research Question

For botnet detection, which machine learning algorithm and related ensemble
method for classifcation are the most accurate?
A botnet, which is a network of compromised devices, is an ongoing threat to
cybersecurity. Controlled by a hacker referred to as a botmaster, the botnet is used to
execute Denial of Service attacks, send spam emails, steal personal information, etc.
Because the botmaster communicates with his botnet via a Command & Control (C&C)
server, the network traffc that the botnet generates can be traced.
Machine learning algorithms have been used to detect botnet traffc from the
ongoing fow of network. Even though there are some previous studies about botnet
detection using machine learning, the accuracy of ensemble methods for botnet detection
is still in question. While ensemble methods were designed to strengthen machine
learning algorithms, are they indeed effective and effcient on botnet detection as well?
This can be evaluated by comparing the accuracy of each algorithm and its ensembles on
botnet traffc dataset.

1.2 Scope

In terms of cybersecurity, network traffc is one of the main types of data that
researchers want to investigate as most of the cybersecurity threats – including Denial of
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Service, spam emails, malware, or worms – are executed remotely through the internet
(Salem, Hershkop, & Stolfo, 2008).
One of the challenges in network traffc analysis is that the amount of the data to
be processed is enormous. This big data, however, can be a beneft for machine learning,
which requires signifcant amounts of data input for its training. The author explored
which machine learning algorithms would provide the most accurate botnet detection
results out of network traffc. The traffc for the evaluation should resemble real-world
traffc and be labeled for the classifcation while the machine learning algorithms for
classifcation were selected based on their popularity for anomaly detection (Salem et al.,
2008). Furthermore, to measure the accuracy of the trained model, The F1 score and the
Matthews correlation coeffcient (MCC) score were used. The F1 score is well known to
compare the difference between two different data and to fnd their similarity. The MCC
does the same work; however, it is well known to be more accurate for skewed data.
For the study, the CTU-13 dataset – a public botnet traffc dataset generated by
Garcia et al. (2014) – was used. This dataset provides a set of refned real botnet traffc
with each network fow labeled.

1.3 Signifcance

Silva, Silva, Pinto, and Salles (2013) indicated botnet has been growing as a
signifcant threat since the frst botnet, EggDrop, was reported in 1993. For example,
Chandrasekar et al. (2017) reported that the Necurs botnet was one of the most active
distributors of malware in 2016. Observing just one day on November 24, 2016, Necurs
sent fve spam runs that generated more than 2.3 million spam emails including JavaScript
downloaders, VBS, and .wsf attachments. Also, according to the same report
(Chandrasekar et al., 2017) the Mirai botnet drove the largest DDoS attack ever recorded
in 2016 on the French hosting company OVH peaking at 1Tbps. The Mirai botnet mostly
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targeted IoT devices, such as home routers, DVRs, and internet-connected cameras. As
Gartner predicted that there will be more than 20 billion IoT devices in the world by 2020
(van der Meulen, 2017), it is important that botnets such as Mirai are addressed.
The speed of its growth is also rapid. In the most recent report from Spamhaus
(Spamhaus Botnet Threat Report 2017, 2018), the number of Control and Command
server (C&C), which botmasters use to communicate with bots, hosted by Amazon in
2017 increased 6 times against that of 2016. All the other botent-hosting Internet Service
Providers within top 10 rank in the report also increased in the number of C&Cs by at
least 3 times against the previous year.
Obviously, because there is no solution to stop hackers from attacking a network
or a host, prevention methods that prohibit the attack before the attacker starts the task
have been discussed. Even though there are previous studies where the researchers make
use of different machine learning algorithms to detect botnet detection (Livadas, Walsh,
Lapsley, & Strayer, 2006; Lu, Rammidi, & Ghorbani, 2011; Sangkatsanee,
Wattanapongsakorn, & Charnsripinyo, 2011; Strayer, Lapsely, Walsh, & Livadas, 2008),
still the accuracy and performance of ensemble methods for botnet detection have not
been discussed yet. In this regard, this study evaluated the several popular machine
learning algorithms for classifcation along with their ensembles. This would be a help
future researcher to decide which algorithms they want to choose during their preparation
of Intrusion Detection System.

1.4 Assumptions

The study required a collection of data that includes botnet traffc and a library that
provides reliable machine learning algorithms. Regarding with those, the following
assumptions had been made.
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1. The CTU-13 dataset shows similar patterns, characteristics, and the types of traffcs
with the real-world network traffc.
2. The normal and background traffc in the CTU-13 dataset do not carry malicious
traffc such as traffc of another botnet.
3. The Scikit-learn library provides algorithms that work in the same way or similarly
with other machine learning libraries, such as Tensorfow, Caffe, etc. Therefore, the
evaluation results from the same algorithm with the same dataset will be similar
regardless of libraries.

1.5 Limitations

The limitations associated with the study are:
1. As the packet traces as pcap fles are enormous and need to be aggregated into
fows, such as NetFlow.
2. While Scikit-learn library only handles numeric data type such as integer and foat,
the data includes string types as well. For example, TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc. are
values of the Protocol feature, and SR A, INT, FA R, etc. are values of the Flags
feature. Therefore, a proper preprocessing of the data is essential.

1.6 Delimitation

The delimitations of this research include:
1. For the evaluation, this study used the NetFlow data that was aggregated out of pcap
fles by Garcia et al. (2014)
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2. Therefore, this study did not cover feature extraction by using already refned data
from the previous study.
3. This study took into account 3 datasets among 13 total datasets that were chosen
because of their relatively higher ratio of botnet traffc.
4. This study focused on evaluating which ML algorithm and ensemble methods
would be effective for botnet detection and did not consider deploying the
evaluation process into an actual intrusion detection system.

1.7 Summary

This chapter provided the scope, signifcance, research question, assumptions,
limitations, delimitations, defnitions, and other background information for the research
project.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to botnet detection and
machine learning technologies for classifcation.

2.1 Botnet

Botnet history dates back at least 1993 when EggDrop had emerged with the new
concept that the victim device is connected to an IRC channel to listen for malicious
commands from a Botmaster (Silva et al., 2013). Traditionally, botnets have been
featuring centralized architectures where a botmaster uses a Control and Command
(C&C) server to communicate with the bots as shown in Figure 2.1. The advantage of
using a C&C server is that it enables quick communication and easy monitoring.
However, a centralized architecture also means that the C&C server itself can be a single
point of failure (Micro, 2006; Wang, Sparks, & Zou, 2010). For the protocol, Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) has been used popularly because of its fexibility. The IRC protocol
supports not only group multicast but also unicast between two members, which enables a
botmaster to carry out an attack to a specifc group in the botnet (Grizzard, Sharma,
Nunnery, Kang, & Dagon, 2007). However, despite those benefts of the IRC, IRC is
vulnerable to interruption and easy to detect because it is not popular in corporate
networks. For this reason, HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which is one of the most
common traffc in networks, has become popular for the C&C communication (Micro,
2010). Botnet also has a decentralized architecture based on peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol
as shown in Figure 2.1. Because there is no central server for a botnet, it is more diffcult
to destroy a P2P botnet because detecting a number of bots does not guarantee they make
up the entire botnet (Grizzard et al., 2007).
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Figure 2.1. A centralized botnet architecture.

Figure 2.2. A decentralized P2P botnet architecture.

2.2 Machine Learning for Classifcation

“An Intrusion detection system (IDS) aids the network to resist external attacks by
providing a wall of defense to confront the attacks of computer systems on Internet (Tsai,
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Hsu, Lin, & Lin, 2009).” Moreover, “studies make use of either a single machine learning
techniques or a combination of multiple machine learning techniques, in the form of
classifers that are used to determine whether the incoming traffc is benign or malicious”
(Tsai et al., 2009). In the previous research – including Livadas et al. (2006); Lu et al.
(2011); Sangkatsanee et al. (2011); Strayer et al. (2008) – where they used supervised
machine learning algorithms, three algorithms (naive Bayes, decision tree, and (artifcial)
neural networks) were most frequently adopted.

2.2.1 Naive Bayes

Naive Bayes method is a simple and intuitive classifcation technique based on the
Bayes’ theorem that describes the probability of an event from prior knowledge of the
condition that potentially related to the event (McCallum, Nigam, et al., 1998). Naive
Bayes algorithm assumes that each feature contributes independently to the probability of
an event. Specifcally in machine learning, the naive Bayes classifer calculates all the
probabilities of all classes (values) for a target feature and selects the one with the highest
probability. Furthermore, Gaussian naive Bayes (GNB) assumes that the values associated
with each class of each feature follow a Gaussian distribution. Even though these two
assumptions in naive Bayes and Gaussian naive Bayes are unlikely to happen in real
network traffc environment, it shows relatively better results than other models like
logistic regression. Additionally, this algorithm is less computationally intense and
generates the mining model quickly. Due to its simplicity and fastness, it is popularly used
for SPAM fltering and other real-time detections. For example, Metsis, Androutsopoulos,
and Paliouras (2006) evaluated accuracies of different types of naive Bayes for SPAM
fltering.
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2.2.2 Artifcial Neural Networks (Multi-layer Perceptron)

Neural networks (NN), analogous to the human brain, refer to large connections of
simple units called neurons. Consisting of three layers (the input layer, hidden layer(s)
and the output layer0, neural networks take each record and passes its features into input
layer, and then the model makes decisions calculating weights of hidden neurons to get
the single highest value at the output layer. A feed-forward neural network where the
output of one layer is used as input to the next layer does iterate for the same data to
compare the output to true value so that it adjusts the weights in the hidden neurons with
its error term. Recurrent neural networks, however, adopt feedback loops between
neurons, which more resembles human brains (Nielsen, 2015). According to Tsai et al.
(2009), a back-propagation neural network works by feeding back errors of misclassifed
terms to the network so that they are not repeated in the further iterations.

2.2.3 Decision Tree

As another popular classifcation method, a decision tree (DT) generates a tree-like
model of decisions based on decision rules inferred from the data. Unlikely other machine
learning algorithms, a decision tree is easy to interpret with a tree visualization. Also, it
works for both categorical and numerical variables as well since it doesn’t require an
assumption about the data distribution and classifer structure. Over ftting and data loss
when categorizing numeric variables, however, are the most practical diffculties in a
decision tree classifer (Quinlan, 1987). According to Rokach and Maimon (2014), a
decision tree is built by splitting the training data into sub-data samples based on the most
signifcantly differentiating feature. When a new incoming data arrives, the attribute of the
data is checked all the way down from the root of the tree, eventually ending up to a leaf
node that represents the classifcation of the data.
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2.3 Ensemble Methods

For a system that utilize machine learning technology for either classifcation,
regression and clustering, using multiple training models is not so uncommon
(Mendes-Moreira, Soares, Jorge, & Sousa, 2012). By using ensemble methods, one can
make classifers more powerful by combining different classifer into one or iteratively
training a classifer. The typical ways of combining two or more classifer are majority
voting and weighted voting (Dietterich et al., 2000). Also, sub-sampling approaches
called boosting and bagging have been studied in previous researches(Breiman, 1996;
Freund & Schapire, 1995). In this section, those three types of ensemble methods are
explained.

2.3.1 Voting

Voting is the simplest way to form an ensemble. Voting classifers consist of
multiple models of different types. In the training step, all the models are trained
separately with whole training data and it averages the posterior probabilities that are
calculated by each model in the recognition step. Panda and Patra (2009) explains that by
combining outputs of several classifers, the risk of selecting a poorly performing
classifer can be reduced. The voting method can be weighted where weighted voting lets
each classifer hold different voting power. According to previous research (Ekbal & Saha,
2011), where the researchers constructed a weighted vote-based classifer ensemble for
Named Entity Recognition, the Genetic Algorithm ensemble for classifying 4 deferent
language group in India outperforms all the other individual classifers (Maximum
Entropy, Conditional Random Field, and Support Vector Machine) when it comes to F1
measure. Another fnding of this research is that an increase in the number of classifers
may not always increase the overall performance of their system. For example, when they
evaluated the 80 best performing ME-based classifers, the accuracy is the same with the
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140 best-performing ME classifers and with all 152 ME classifers. This is the same case
when they increased the training size from 100K to 312K. The accuracy measure
increases as the training size becomes larger, but the rate of improvement decreases
gradually (Ekbal & Saha, 2011).

2.3.2 Bagging

The bagging method (Breiman, 1996), also called bootstrap aggregation because
it uses bootstrap sampling (Efron & Tibshirani, 1994), randomly breaks down the original
training data to make several sub-training datasets and trains a classifer from each of
those training subsamples. The predictions are then combined via averaging for regression
or majority voting for classifcation. In the paper, Quinlan et al. (1996) evaluated boosting
and bagging on C4.5 decision tree with a collection of datasets from the UCI Machine
Learning Repository. In the experiment, Bagged C4.5 and Boosted C4.5 generally showed
the markedly lower error rates than those of C4.5. Interestingly, even though boosting
shows a reduced error rate by 15% over C4.5 and 10% over bagging and additionally
outperforms bagging in 20 of the 27 data sets, boosting shows more erratic outcomes. For
example, it led to a 36% increase in error on the iris dataset and 26% on colic. According
to Freund and Schapire (1995), that could be because of overftting explaining a large
number of trials leads to the classifer to become very complex. The solution that Quinlan
et al. (1996) tried was stopping the ensemble learner when any classifer shows zero error.
With this approach, C4.5 appeared that it only needs three boosted trials to achieve the
objective.

2.3.3 Boosting

Boosting methods, which were suggested by Kearns and Valiant (1994) to create a
single strong learner from several weak learners, were strengthened by Schapire (1990).
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Boosting also manipulates the training data like bagging, but it maintains a set of weights
on training data. Especially with methods such as AdaBoost, weighted errors of each
model update weights on the training data, giving more weight on the data with the lower
accuracy and less on the data with the higher (Vezhnevets & Vezhnevets, 2005). Zhou,
Wu, and Tang (2002) explained that a boosting learner combines the predictions from
multiple classifers of homogeneous type, and the results are averaged out for regression
or voted for classifcation.

2.3.4 Random forest

Along with the machine learning algorithms and ensemble methods, the author
also considered random forests algorithm to test. According to Breiman (2001), the
random forests classifer is a type of ensemble methods that built with multiple decision
trees that are independently bootstrap-sampled. As a bagging of decision tree, random
forest is explained as “These averaging techniques improve the performance of single tree
models by creating multiple trees and, randomly selecting a subset of variables at each
node. This reduces variance more than in single trees” (Elith, Leathwick, & Hastie,
2008). Yeh, Chi, and Lin (2014) describe the advantages of random forests indicating that
the variables can be both continuous and categorical. Also, a random forests classifer is
recommended by Yeh et al. (2014) because it is robust against overftting by averaging
trees during the run which also results in “low-bias and low-variation but highly accurate
classifcation and predictions.” The same author also suggested that random forests are
preferred over Support Vector Machine or Neural network because of the strengths
explained above.
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2.4 Related Works

In the paper by Livadas et al. (2006), machine learning algorithms for
classifcation, i.e. J48 decision tree, naive Bayes, and Bayesian network were employed to
identify C&C traffc of IRC-based botnets. By capturing real-life network traffcs from
Dartmouth’s wireless campus network, and also generating botnet testbed traffc from the
Kaiten bot, they demonstrated that only the naive Bayes classifers achieved low false
negative rate (FNR) identifying 35 out of the 38 botnet fows with an FNR of 7.89%. On
the other hand, the J48 and the Bayesian networks classifers performed poorly possibly
because of overftting.
Garcı́a, Zunino, and Campo (2014) conducted a survey on network-based botnet
detection methods. There several suggested botnet detection methods were compared. In
the following sections, the tree systems are introduced along with the analysis by Garcı́a et
al.

2.4.1 BotSniffer

The BotSniffer (Gu, Zhang, & Lee, 2008) processed the sniffed network packets
by grouping hosts that connect to the same destination considering port numbers as well
and then separating the groups into time windows. The frst approach is to examine if
there are hosts that had triggered attacks including SPAM sending and port scanning. One
group is marked as a possible botnet if more than a half of the hosts in the group shows the
attack’s fngerprints. The second approach focuses more on IRC protocol responses, by
looking for hosts that answered similar IRF responses using the F1 score as a similarity
function. IRC responses are clustered on the basis of this similarity measure. In the case
where the biggest cluster is more than half the size of a group, this group is marked as a
possible botnet.
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Garcı́a et al. (2014) stated that:
This paper is one of the most cited papers in the botnet detection feld. It
presents several behavioral techniques to detect botnets that accomplish good
results. However, much new data and botnets have been found since its
publication. The dataset used for validation may be too scarce for generalizing
the technique. Only one real IRC botnet was captured. The rest of the dataset
is composed of one IRC text log and fve custom-compiled LAN botnets.
Garcı́a et al. (2014) also pointed out that the possible bias by whitelist fltering done to the
dataset during preprocessing stage was not analyzed.

2.4.2 BotMiner

The BotMiner detection framework (Gu, Perdisci, Zhang, Lee, et al., 2008) has
three phase of analysis. At the frst phase, it groups hosts with similar activity patterns
derived from fow information. The IP addresses, ports, and the network profle as well as
statistical measures including number of fows per hour and average bytes per packets
were used to make similar host groups along with X-means clustering method. The
second phase groups hosts regarding with similar attacking patterns. The Snort IDS was
used to identify attacks. At the third phase, the similarities from the previous 2 phases are
utilized to score similarities between hosts. But Garcı́a et al. (2014) pointed out the fact
that the dataset is not published and no explanation provided how the dataset was verifed.
Also, the design – where a list of well-known hosts should be maintained – could be
error-prone and time-consuming.
But for encouraging results, Garcı́a et al. (2014) stated that:
Unlike other proposals, this work uses one novel idea to differentiate between
botnets and manual attacks: botnets act maliciously and always communicate
in a similar way, but the manual attacks only act maliciously.
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2.4.3 BotHunter

The BotHunter framework (Gu, Porras, Yegneswaran, Fong, & Lee, 2007) utilized
a state-based infection sequence model. By using the modifed Snort IDS added with two
proprietary detection plug-ins, “it looks for evidence of botnet life cycle phases to drive a
bot dialogue correlation analysis” (Garcı́a et al., 2014). Each host gets the infection score
derived from IDS warning and a host is labeled as bot when the score meets certain
thresholds. In addition to this local host infection, when there is attack propagation or
evidence of outward bot, an infection is reported. Because the Snort IDS is statical,
detections by the BotHunter is also static. For this reason, some known botnet servers can
be embedded into the Snort confguration, and the sequence of bytes in the binary
download and the Snort fngerprints could be used.
Gu et al. (2007) pointed out that the accuracy metrics is not complete as the
proposal reports either TPR or FP and TN for each experiment they conducted. Also, the
BotHunter neither uses the traffc from a host nor differentiates between botnets and
manual (or automatic) attacks.
Garcı́a et al. (2014) also indicated that:
However, as the model is based on the life cycle of botnets, it is very probable
that it could work fne for this situation. The method has two major advances.
First, it seems capable of analyzing, detecting and reporting botnets in real
time. Second, it is the only proposal that was published as a product.

2.5 Summary

This chapter provided a review of the literature relevant to botnet detection and
machine learning algorithms for classifcation. The next chapter provides the
methodology to be used in the research project.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Overview

In this thesis, the author evaluated the three most popular machine learning
algorithms for botnet classifcation – Gaussian naive Bayes (GNB), neural networks (NN)
and decision tree (DT) – based on the previous research by Salem et al. (2008). the
well-known ensemble methods (voting, bagging, and boosting) were also measured to
help address the research question: For botnet detection, which machine learning
algorithm and related ensemble method for classifcation are the most accurate? To
compare these classifcation models, the training time and two different measures (F1
score and MCC score) were calculated. Furthermore, the random forest (RF) classifer,
which is one of the popular algorithm based one the bagging method, was also evaluated.
With the already aggregated NetFlow data, CTU-13, the experiment was
conducted on the Rice cluster, which is a part of Purdue Community Clusters. “Rice is
optimized for Purdue’s communities running traditional, tightly-coupled science and
engineering applications” (ITaP Research Computing, 2017). On the cluster, the
evaluation system was constructed with all ML classifers, their ensembles, and accuracy
measurement methods.
Once the evaluation program was set, the training data was input to the system to
generate classifcation models and ensembles. The test data, then, was input to generate
the prediction outcome. The running time was measured during those training and test
processes. Figure 3.1 describe the overview of the experiment.
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Figure 3.1. Overview of the experiment.

3.2 Dataset

Finding an appropriate network traffc dataset for machine learning is challenging
since, because supervised machine learning classifers require the data to be labeled unless
the target feature is already in the dataset, labeling each network traffc can be very
onerous. Even further, the data is preferred to resemble a real-world network traffc to be
cleanly captured at a well-administered lab. Specifcally, Sommer and Paxson (2010)
discussed the importance of getting a perfect data which is not defcient in certain
statistical characteristics. For this reason, even though Honeynet project, CAIDA and
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other similar types of projects have presented an enormous number of network traffc
dataset, researchers have generated their own datasets like those of Livadas et al. (2006);
Saad et al. (2011); Shiravi, Shiravi, Tavallaee, and Ghorbani (2012). For example, Shiravi
et al. (2012) set up a distributed DoS attack using an IRC botnet to generate the dataset
which is suitable for intrusion detection.
The CTU-13 dataset is also one of these cases. Garcia et al. (2014) created the
CTU-13 dataset where the data is labeled as botnet, normal, or background. Garcia et al.
(2014) mentioned that even though there had been several botnet datasets downloadable,
such as Dainotti, King, Papale, Pescape, et al. (2012); Saad et al. (2011); Shiravi et al.
(2012); Sony and Cho (2000), they are either a) not representative of the real-world
traffc, b) not labeled, or c) not suitable for every detection algorithms that the authors
wanted to compare. For these reasons, the CTU-13 dataset was generated with several
fundamental design goals as follow.
Garcia et al. (2014) set the design goals (Garcia et al., 2014):
• “Must have real botnets attacks and not simulations.
• Must have unknown traffc from a large network.
• Must have ground-truth labels for training and evaluating the methods.
• Must include different types of botnets.
• Must have several bots infected at the same time to capture
synchronization patterns.
• Must have NetFlow fles to protect the privacy of the users.”
The CUT-13 dataset was captured in the CTU University, the Czech Republic in
2011. On top of a Linux Debian host, they constructed a set of virtual machines with the
Microsoft Windows XP SP2 operating system and bridged each virtual machine into the
University network. After infecting the virtual machines with a particular botnet, they
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captured the traffc both on the Linux host and on one of the University router using
tcpdump. Once they gathered all pcap fles for the 13 different infection scenarios, the
captures were aggregated into the NetFlow fle standards in the form of CSV fle. Each
fow was labeled with Botnet, Normal, or Background where two former labels meant the
network traffcs were generated from their testbed and the last label meant the traffc came
from the University networks.
For the evaluation, the author chose three datasets out of 13 datasets in the
CTU-13: Scenarios 4, 10 and 11. The reason for selecting these datasets is that they
feature the same bot, Rbot, but with different ratios of botnet traffc: 0.15%, 8.11%, and
7.6%, respectively.

3.3 Accuracy Metrics

To measure the accuracy of a classifer, taking into account the confusion matrix is
the most common way; in particular, precision and recall are often used. Precision pertains
the percentage of correctly predicted event from the pool of total predicted events while
recall concerns the percentage of correctly predicted event from the pool of actual events.

Precision =

TP
TP
, Recall =
T P + FP
T P + FN

(3.1)

3.3.1 F1 score

Taking both precision and recall into account, the F1 score gives a more balanced
view compared to using only precision or recall. The F1 score can be between 0 and 1. A
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F1 score of 0 means there are no true positives, 1 means there are neither false negatives
or false positives, and undefned when there are only true negatives in the prediction.

F1 = 2 ∗

P∗R
, where P is Precision, R is Recall
P+R

(3.2)

which can also be represented as:

F1 =

2T P
2T P + FN + FP

(3.3)

3.3.2 Matthews Correlation Coeffcient(MCC)

The Matthews correlation coeffcient, also known as the phi coeffcient, was
introduced by Matthews (1975). As another measure of the quality of binary
classifcation, the MCC incorporates True Negative as well, unlike the F1 score. The range
of the MCC lie between -1 to +1 where +1 means a perfect prediction, 0 no better than a
random prediction, and -1 perfect disagreement between true values and predictions.
T P ∗ T N − FP ∗ FN

MCC = p

(T P + FP)(T P + FN)(T N + FP)(T N + FN)

According to Boughorbel, Jarray, and El-Anbari (2017):
Most standard machine learning algorithms work well with balanced training
data but they face challenges when the dataset classes are imbalanced. In such
situation, classifcation methods tend to be biased towards the majority class.
These algorithms are ineffcient in this case mainly because they seek to
maximize a measure of performance such as accuracy which is no longer a
proper measure for imbalanced data.

(3.4)

21
Taking True Negatives into consideration, the MCC is regarded more robust to the
data imbalance. In the same study, Boughorbel et al. (2017) showed that MCC and Area
Under ROC Curve (AUC) are more robust to data imbalance than the F1 score and
accuracy. In the recent studies by Chicco (2017); Powers (2011), MCC was claimed to be
the most informative score in a context of confusion matrix and to be the best
measurement for a binary classifcation.

3.4 Machine Learning Library

There are multiple machine learning libraries available, such as Theano,
TensorFlow, Scikit-learn, Caffe, etc. In this thesis, Scikit-learn was used because it comes
as a service consisting of all algorithms to be used.
The reason why Scikit-learn was chosen rather than the other popular machine
learning libraries like SparkML and Torch, which can also parallelize the classifer to take
advantage of using big data, was a lack of stable implementation of ensemble methods at
the time of this thesis.
Scikit-learn is well known for its high-level functions that allow users to take care
of the parameters of functions, or confguration rather than their implementation itself
(Pedregosa et al., 2011). For example, to build a Linear Support Vector Machine with
Scikit-learn, one can call LinearSVC() training with the researcher’s dataset and then test
iteratively changing its parameters such as class weights, the maximum number of
iterations to be run, etc. For the classifcation, the following methods were used.
• naive bayes.GaussianNB(): GaussianNB() works by assuming a Gaussian
distribution of data. In this reason, the data should be normalized beforehand.
• neural network.MLPClassifer(): This multi-layer perceptron classifer has
parameters including hidden layer sizes defning number of hidden layers and
neurons and solver for weight optimization.

22
• tree.DecisionTreeClassifer(): This builds a decision tree having max depth,
min samples split, etc. as parameters.
For the ensembles, ensemble.AdaboostClassifer(), ensemble.BaggingClassifer(),
ensemble.VotingClassifer() were used. The frst two methods take a single type of base
estimator to make an ensemble, and number of estimators can be set to defne the
maximum number of estimators at which the ensemble method is terminated. In case of a
perfect ft, the learning procedure stops early. VotingClassifer() takes a list of estimators
to make a voting ensemble.
Scikit-learn also provides various accuracy metrics for classifcation, regression,
clustering, etc. In this study, metrics.f1 score() and metrics.matthews corrcoef() were
used.

3.5 Data preparation and evaluation

Table 3.1 provides the list of features in the CTU-13 dataset. After capturing
PCAP fles, Garcia et al. carefully selected features while aggregating the traffc to
NetFlow standards. While the previous work used WEKA tool for the classifcation which
can handle categorical data, a proper data preprocessing was needed for this thesis.
Because Scikit-learn only expects continuous input, all categorical features should be
encoded with sklearn.preprocessing.LabelEncoder.
After encoding, data standardization was conducted. While Scikit-learn provides
functionality to convert the data into standard normally distributed data which is Gaussian
with zero mean and unit variance, scaling the data to a certain range is an alternative
preprocessing.
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Table 3.1. Data features in the CTU-13 dataset (Garcia et al., 2014)
Feature
Start time
End time
Duration
Protocol
Src IP address
Src port number
Direction
Dst IP address
Dst port number
Flags
Type of services
Number of packets
Number of bytes
Number of fows
Label

Type
Numerical
Numerical
Numerical
Categorical
Categorical
Categorical
Categorical
Categorical
Categorical
Categorical
Categorical
Numerical
Numerical
Numerical
Categorical

To do so, sklearn.preprocessing.MinMaxScaler offers “scaling features to lie
between a given minimum and maximum,” which is considered to provide “robustness to
very small standard deviations of features and preserving zero entries in sparse data”
(Pedregosa et al., 2011). For more details about data preprocessing, please refer to
Appendix A.
Once preprocessing was done, the data was randomly split into the training data
and the test data with the ratio of 8 to 2. For each classifer, the input parameters were
selected to the optimum after a few empirical tests. For each scenario, the average time
and accuracy of 5 times of the each classifer were recorded as the fnal results.

3.6 Deliverables

From this research, the following were delivered to future researchers.
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• A comparative study of ML algorithms and ensembles used to detect botnet traffc
based on a literature survey.
• A report on the authors approach towards the research questions and the way to
implement the evaluable to be scalable.

3.7 Summary

This chapter described methodology for the research including a description of
dataset, accuracy metrics, machine learning library, data preprocessing, and deliverables.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

This chapter provides the result of the experiment. It includes the comparison of
accuracies and training time.

4.1 Results

To evaluate the classifcation algorithms along with ensemble methods for the
CTU-13 dataset, Scikit-learn on a single core of Intel Xeon-E5 with 64GB of memory was
used. The results are described in Table 4.1, Table 4.2, and Figure 4.1.
For every data and algorithms, F1 scores were higher than MCC scores. This is
because the F1 score does not consider the true negatives. For this reason, MCC is
preferred for a binary classifcation. In the following discussion, accuracy refers to MCC
score and S denotes scenario of the dataset.
Among individual algorithms, all showed decent accuracies over 0.91 on S10 and
S11. But for S4, GNB and NN showed poor results of 0.13 and 0.00 respectively. In terms
of the training time, GNB run much faster than other algorithms on S4 and S10. For S11,

Table 4.1. Time consumed for model training (sec)
Method
GNB
NN
DT
Voting
Boosting-GNB
Boosting DT
Bagging-GNB
Bagging-NN
Bagging-DT
RF

Scenario 4
2.68
76.24
25.48
103.05
554.14
56.77
62.90
437.37
175.11
43.17

Scenario 10
1.59
163.86
35.39
139.56
222.48
83.23
22.13
654.84
186.07
63.74

Scenario 11
1.57
21.44
0.62
18.06
15.20
0.77
1.47
41.61
2.65
1.44

Figure 4.1. Experiment results
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Table 4.2. Evaluation result
Method
GNB
NN
DT
Voting
Boosing-GNB
Boosing-DT
Bagging-GNB
Bagging-NN
Bagging-DT
RF

Scenario 4
F1
MCC
0.986159 0.135260
0.998489 0.000000
0.999990 0.996779
0.999117 0.644421
0.967339 0.043543
0.999989 0.996285
0.986170 0.135319
0.998489 0.000000
0.999991 0.996955
0.999997 0.998930

Scenario 10
F1
MCC
0.988762 0.910358
0.992646 0.939776
0.999982 0.999849
0.994763 0.956586
0.867776 0.162963
0.999983 0.999857
0.988758 0.910333
0.993613 0.946912
0.999981 0.999836
0.999988 0.999896

Scenario 11
F1
MCC
0.992302 0.982357
0.993299 0.984639
0.999971 0.999935
0.993841 0.985878
0.378982 0.168781
0.999963 0.999916
0.992253 0.982245
0.993670 0.985486
0.999955 0.999897
0.999972 0.999935

DT run faster taking 0.62 seconds. Regarding S10, even though NN showed high accuracy
as DT, it took 3-4 times longer than DT did.
The only structure difference among the three datasets is the ratio of botnet traffc.
Even though S4 is the largest dataset, it only brings one Rbot having 0.15% of botnet
traffc ratio, which means the dataset is highly scarce. In contrast, S10 has 8.11% of
botnet traffc and S11 has 7.6% which can be considered fairly large enough.
Overall, NN and DT showed relatively higher accuracy than GNB, and NN was
the slowest classifer among all. This pattern appeared the same on the result of voting.
For the voting, it showed relatively higher accuracies on S10 and S11, recording 0.96 and
0.99, respectively while it recorded only 0.64 on S4.
Boosting method did not signifcantly help either GNB or DT. Especially for
GNB, the accuracy signifcantly dropped down on all datasets showing less than 0.17.
Especially it recorded a MCC score of 0.04 on S4 where 0 means no better than random
prediction. The training time was also huge compared to the GNB classifer recording
554.14 seconds on S4 for example. When it comes to boosting DT, The accuracy results
were not largely different from those of DT classifer. But, of course, it took longer time
than DT taking 2-3 times longer than DT did.
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Each bagging algorithm seemed very similar to using a single classifer only for
each dataset. The results of using s bagging classifer showed the same pattern where DT
and NN were relatively more accurate than GNB while GNB run the fastest. But the
training time of bagging was much larger than that of using a classifer without ensemble
methods except when bagging was applied to GNB against S4.
While the ensemble methods offered by Scikit-learn were not signifcantly
benefcial on each algorithm, random forest appeared highly effective in terms of both
accuracy and training time. It showed very decent accuracies in MCC scoring more than
0.998 for every dataset, recording moderate training time compared to other ensembles.
Especially noteworthy is that it took less time than using NN alone.
Figure 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 provide graphical views to compare the classifers against
each scenario based on their time consumption and MCC score.

Figure 4.2. Time and MCC evaluation against S4
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Figure 4.3. Time and MCC evaluation against S10

Figure 4.4. Time and MCC evaluation against S11
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For the S4 data, DT, RF, Boosting DT, and Bagging DT give the predictions of
high quality as shown in Figure 4.2. On the other hand, Bagging DT and Boosting DT
took a longer time than decision tree alone or random forest. Compared to those
classifers, bagging NN or boosting GNB turned out to be the worst with poor predictions
and enormous time consumption. Also, differently from S10 and S11, the neural networks
classifers worked poorly giving a low MCC score.
Figure 4.3 shows slightly different results from those of S4. For S10, most
classifers worked well showing high MCC scores with the exception of Boosting GNB.
Considering time consumption together, GNB, Bagging GNB, DT, RF and Boosing DT
seem reasonable. Similarly with the case of S4, the decision tree classifer and the random
forest classifer gave better MCC that the Gaussian naive Bayes classifer. Unlike S4,
Bagging NN provide accurate prediction, but it took too long which makes considering
bagging neural networks undesirable.
Because the size of S11 is very small compared to the previous 2 datasets, all
classifers ended in 45 seconds for Scenario 11 (Figure 4.4). Similarly with the case of
S10, Boosting GNB gave the poor prediction and the time bagging neural networks took
was longer than any other classifers. This time, the Gaussian naive Bayes and decision
tree, and random forest classifers provided fair accuracies in a very short time.

4.2 Summary

This chapter described the result of the experiment in terms of training time and
accuracy.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, more detailed discussion on the evaluation results and future work
are described.

5.1 Discussion

After the experiment, to detect botnet traffc out of all network traffc, decision tree
without any ensemble method or random forest would be the most reliable approaches.
They run much faster than NN alone and with better accuracy. Even though GNB ran the
fastest, the accuracy varied on the dataset. Unlike the common expectation, adopting
ensemble methods on machine learning algorithms for botnet detection in a hope of
enhancing the accuracy is not preferable because it does not give remarkably more
accurate result while consuming much more time.
Voting showed the same pattern with using other classifers without ensemble
methods. This is on the ground that voting works by averaging out each outcome from the
models.
When it comes to boosting, it showed minimally better accuracy compared to
using a sole algorithm primarily because of the nature of boosting. In boosting, it turns
weak models with slightly better prediction than random into a strong one. In this regard,
it obviously did not make DT strong as it already had a good accuracy. On the other hand,
boosting GNB showed the results that deviated with those of other algorithms. For S4, the
MCC score was near zero which means the prediction is not better than random. As for
S10 and S11, it only showed around 0.16 of MCC which is the opposite result of using a
sole GNB. According to Ting and Zheng (2003), the similar drop-down appeared in a
specifc dataset, Tic-tac-toe. Because Naive Bayes is very stable classifer carrying a
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strong bias, in the boosting process the sub-classifers may not be diverse enough (Ting &
Zheng, 2003). This does warrant additional inquiry.
While training a bagging model, multiple sub-datasets sampled out from the
original dataset make their own classifer. Then predictions from those classifers are
voted. This dataset, however, might not take the beneft from sampling because the data is
too sparse or skewed.
Random forest, as a combination of decision tree, performs implicit feature
selection taking feature importance into consideration. Also making multiple sub-decision
trees with part of features and data rows, it can run extremely faster than other methods
and even can be easily parallelized. Considering parallelization is tough to be
implemented in ensemble methods, Random forest seems like an excellent choice.

5.2 Comparison with the benchmarks

The results of the evaluation were also compared to those of the previous research
by Garcia et al. (2014). In the previous research, the authors separated the entire CTU-13
dataset into two groups considering the following criteria (Garcia et al., 2014):
• The “training and cross-validation datasets should be approximately 80% of the
dataset.
• The testing dataset should be approximately 20% of the dataset.
• None of the botnet families used in the training and cross-validation dataset should
be used in the testing dataset.”
Meeting those criteria, they separated the dataset into training, testing, and
cross-validation carefully considering features, such as the duration in minutes, the
number of clusters, the number of NetFlow and the number of aggregated NetFlows of the
scenarios. Scenarios 1, 2, 6, 8, and 9 were selected for training and cross-validation and
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the others were for testing. Among 20 different botnet detection methods analyzed in the
research, the BClus (Garcıa, 2014) and the BotHunter (Gu et al., 2007) methods were
considered for further comparison with this thesis as they have utilized machine learning
approaches as well as rule-based approaches.
Even though the authors of the research did not adopt MCC score, they measured
F1 scores. The score of Scenario 8 could not be computed because the BotHunter
algorithm could not detect a single TP against the dataset (Garcia et al., 2014). Compared
to the result of this thesis, the F1 scores are far below for all of the Scenarios except
Scenario 11. According to Garcia et al. (2014), the data separation was meant to ensure
that the methods can generalize and detect new behaviors and to avoid the bias toward the
majority class of Background. Thus, the evaluation utilizing three machine learning
algorithms and their ensembles offer better detection accuracy compared to the previous
research.

5.3 Future work

The error metrics from the thesis looks more prominent than those of the
benchmarks from Garcia et al. (2014), but still the gap between those two research can be
narrowed. Firstly, the different use of the dataset can be resolved. while the previous
research used the entire CTU-13 dataset to split the training data and the test data, the
author utilized 3 out of 13 datasets. Secondly, the metric can also be expanded in scope. In
the Garcia et al. (2014), they suggested the new error metric to resolve the semantic gap
between the traditional error metrics and the practical application.
Specifcally Garcia et al. (2014) stated:
The error metrics usually used by researchers to analyze their results (e.g.
FPR, FMeasure) were historically designed from a statistical point of view,
and they are really good to measure differences and to compare most
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methods. But the needs of a network administrator that is going to use a
detection method are slightly different. These error metrics should have a
meaning that can be translated to the network.
To resolve the problem, they established the following principles for a proper error
metric (Garcia et al., 2014):
• “Errors should account for IP addresses instead of NetFlows.
• To detect a botnet IP address (TP) early is better than later.
• To miss a botnet IP address (FN) early is worst than later.
• The value of detecting a normal IP address (TN) is not affected by time.
• The value of missing a normal IP address (FP) is not affected by time.”
Considering the principles together would give a more reliable comparison of the
thesis to the benchmark study.
Also, even though the CTU-13 dataset were generated for the use of machine
learning technologies for botnet detection, it is still the best to use the actual datasets to
which the detection system would be applied. In this reason, capturing network packets of
the targeted network and evaluating the algorithms against the network data would
provide the more practical results.

5.4 Summary

In this study, three popular machine learning algorithms – Gaussian naive Bayes,
neural networks, decision tree – were tested against part of the CTU-13 dataset featuring
one or more Rbots. Furthermore, the ensemble methods – voting, boosting, and bagging –
were also compared to measure how signifcantly benefcial the ensemble methods would
be for botnet detection. Along with these, Random forest. Based on this study, decision
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tree without any ensemble methods or random forest would be the most reliable
approaches to detect botnet traffc out of all network traffc.
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APPENDIX A. DATA PREPARATION

In this appendix, the methods taken to pre-process the CTU-13 data is introduced.
Because the CTU-13 dataset contains categorical values for the most of the
feature, it needed to be transformed into numeric data that Scikit-learn can process. In this
regard, sklearn.preprocessing offers LabelEncoder that encodes labels with value
between 0 and n classes-1. In addition, sklearn.preprocessing.MinMaxScaler
transforms features by scaling each feature to a given range. To split the dataset into
training and test set, both masking and using model selection.train test split
could be applied. After practice, masking approach was mainly used.
def data_prep(df):
from sklearn import preprocessing, decomposition, model_selection

categorical = [’Prot’, ’Src_IP’, ’Src_Port’, \
’Dst_IP’, ’Dst_Port’, ’Flags’, ’Tos’]

#Categorical
le = preprocessing.LabelEncoder()
for col in categorical:
df[col] = le.fit_transform(df[col])

#Normalize
scaler = preprocessing.MinMaxScaler()
toNormalize = [’Durat’, ’Packets’, ’Bytes’, ’Flows’]
for col in toNormalize:
df[col] = scaler.fit_transform( df[col] )

df[’Target’] = 1
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df.loc [ df[’Label’] == ’Botnet’, ’Target’ ] = 2

msk = np.random.rand( len(df) ) < 0.8
trainDF = df[msk]
testDF = df[~msk]
#X = df[ cols[:-1] ]
#y = df[ ’Target’ ]
#return model_selection.train_test_split(X, y, train_size=0.6, random_state=42)

return trainDF[cols[:-1]], trainDF[’Target’], testDF[cols[:-1]], testDF[’Target’]

